Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

State of Utah v. Jordan Vance Calliham : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
attorney generals office; attorney for appellee.
Happy J. Morgan; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Calliham, No. 20000391 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2760

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

Appeal No. 20000391

vs.

District No. 9917-00142

JORDAN VANCE CALLIHAM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Priori!

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the decision of the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson, Seventh Judicial District Court, Grand Countyi

HAPPY J. MORGAN
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ""
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPEL sUI'
8 SOUTH 100 EAST
MOAB, UTAH 84532

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTN. APPELLATE DIVISION
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR
P.O. BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854

iiw;
Utafu

OCT
Paute|
Cleric of

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

Appeal No. 20000391

vs.

District No. 9917-00142

JORDAN VANCE CALLfflAM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the decision of the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson, Seventh Judicial District Court, Grand County.

HAPPY J. MORGAN
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
8 SOUTH 100 EAST
MOAB, UTAH 84532

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTN. APPELLATE DIVISION
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6™ FLOOR
P.O. BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
4
ARGUMENT:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TRY
JORDAN
5
B.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS JURORS
FOR CAUSE
8
C. MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW IS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO
MISSING PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
CONCLUSION
ADDENDA
I.

Findings, Judgment and Commitment dated March 16,
2000.

10
13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Caselaw:
Blasco v. State. 680 So.2d 1052 (Fla.App. 1996)
11
Commonwealth v. Harris. 379 N.E.2d 1073 (1978)
11
Glasmann v. Second District Court. 12 P.2d 361 (1932) . . . 7
Shadle v. Municipality of Anchorage. 941 P.2d 904
(Alaska App. 1997)
11
State in Interest of Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1985) 7
State in re A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091 (Utah App. 1997)
6
State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992)
12
State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503 (Utah 1997)
9, 10
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)
6
State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170 (Utah 1992)
2
State v. Leleae. 993 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1999) . . . . 2, 12
State v. Menzies. 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992) . 2, 4, 8, 11, 12
State v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992)
7
State v. Perez. 946 P.2d 724, 732 (Utah App. 1997) . . 2, 6
State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983)
4, 10
State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1991)
9
Statutes:
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN. § 6 2 A - 7 - 1 0 1
ANN. § 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 AND 1 0 2 . 5
ANN. § 7 8 - 2 A - 3 ( 2 ) ( E )
ANN. § 7 8 ~ 3 A - 5 0 2
ANN. § 7 8 - 3 A - 6 0 1
ANN. § 7 8 - 3 A - 6 0 2
ANN. § 7 8 - 3 A - 6 0 3

(1998)

5, 6
2
1
5

4, 5, 6
3, 5
5,

7

Rules and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Provisions:
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,

AMEND VI

8

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I , SEC. 12

8
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

Appeal No. 20000391

vs.

District No. 9917-00142

JORDAN VANCE CALLIHAM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE RULE 3 because the sentencing of Jordan Vance Calliham

("Jordan"), entered on

March 16,2000, is considered the final decision of the District Court. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§78~2A-3 (2)(E).

The Notice of Appeal was filed on April 17, 2000, within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Thus, pursuant to UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 4(E), this appeal is
timely.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the District Court have jurisdiction to try a juvenile when the matter was not

certifiedfromjuvenile court and the crime was not a direct-filing crime? Appellant asks this
Court to review the trial court's exercise ofjurisdiction over this case under a plain error

standard because this error was obvious and harmful. See State v Perez. 946 P.2d 724, 732
(UtahApp. 1997).
2.

Did the trial court err in permitting prospective jurors to continue serving after it

was discovered that they were acquainted with one or more witnesses, had relatives in law
enforcement, and had other relationships with attorneys or parties in the case*? The question of
whether a trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror for cause is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. See State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah 1992); State v. Leleae. 993
P.2d 232,239 (Utah App. 1999).
3.

Did the numerous and substantive portions missingfromthe trial transcript make

meaningful appellate review impossible, thus requiring a new triaP This Court has the
prerogative to notice plain errors on the face of the record. £ge State v. Menzies. 845 P.2d 220,
225 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jordan appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of Assault of a Prisoner, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN, §§ 76-5-102,76-5-102.5 (1998). Jordan was a
seventeen (17) year old minor at the time of the alleged assault. He was an inmate at the San
Juan County Jail.
On October 7,1999, Jordan was charged by Information with Assault of a Prisoner, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102,76-5-102.5 (1998). Jordan
stood trial by a jury on March 14,2000, and was found guilty of the above mentioned charge,
Jordan was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term of not more than five (5) years on
March 16,2000. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 17,2000,
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 30,1999, Appellant, Jordan Vance Calliham allegedly assaulted another
inmate at the San Juan County Jail while awaiting trial on another matter. (Tr. at pp. 58,62) At
the time of the alleged assault, Jordan was seventeen (17) years old. The charge was brought by
criminal information filed directly in the District Court. (R0001) with no certification or other
such hearing being held before any juvenile court. Jordan was not treated as a serious youth
offender pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3A-602, because the offense charged was not one of
the listed offenses in said statute.
During jury selection, counsel for Jordan requested through counsel that four prospective
jurors be excused for cause which the trial court denied. (Tr. at p. 48). Prospective jurors
Whitehat, Bradford, Lee, and Black had relationships with people involved in law enforcement.
(Tr. at p. 48). Because one of the State's witnesses was a law enforcement officer, the partiality
of these prospective jurors was brought into question. (Tr. at p. 58) None of these particular
potential jurors ended up sitting on the jury. (Tr. at p. 49); however, other jurors who sat on the
jury at trial were partial because they had read local newspapers and were likely aware of
Jordan's prior conviction for another crime. (Tr. at pp. 32,45).
Jordan's entire trial, including jury selection, took less than one day. The portion of the
Transcript dealing with jury selection consists of approximately forty-eight (48) pages. (Tr. at
pp. 2-49). In those forty-eight (48) pages, there are approximately one hundred and thirty-three
(133) notations of "inaudible" in the Transcript. Id. The vast majority of these "inaudible"
responses are from prospective jurors. IJL At least twenty-five (25) inaudible responses are from
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prospective jurors whose impartiality had been brought into question by their previous answers
which are on the record Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The most fundamental error in this case is jurisdictional. The trial court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case because the matter was not certified from the juvenile court, nor did
the direct filing statute apply. The direct filing statute, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3A-601, grants the
district court jurisdiction only if the minor has been previously committed to a secure facility as
defined by statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3A-601(1)(B). Jordan was not committed to such
a facility.
Even if the trial court had proper jurisdiction, error during jury voir dire also requires
reversal. A law enforcement officer was one of the State's main witnesses in this case. The trial
court failed to remove several jurors for cause who had relationships with law enforcement
officers. Jordan had to use his peremptory challenges to remove these potential jurors leaving
other partial members on the actual jury. Seg State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994)
(stating that failing to remove potential juror for cause is error if prejudice is demonstrated).
Finally, the transcript in this case is riddled with omissions. There are one hundred and
thirty-three (133) notations of "inaudible" in the fourty-eight (48) pages of the trial transcript
dealing with voir dire. (Tr. at pp. 2-49). These omissions require reversal in that they deprive
Jordan of the opportunity to effectively pursue an appeal. See State v. Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439,
(Utah 1983) (holding that missing responses in the record during voir dire required a new trial).
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ARGUMENT
A,

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TRY JORDAN.
The District Court did not have jurisdiction to try Jordan and should never have done so.

Jordan was seventeen (17) when the alleged assault occurred, Jordan was not certified from the
juvenile court under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3A-603 ! , nor was the offense a serious youth offender
offense under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-6022. Rather, the prosecution in this case charged
Jordan directly in the District Court (R0001). UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-601, contains the direct
file provision and grants the district court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over juveniles sixteen
years of age or older if the prosecutor charges murder, aggravated murder, or any felony and the
juvenile has a prior commitment to a "secure" facility as defined in UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-7-

1

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603(l)-(2) provides: If a criminal information filed in
accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-502(3) alleges the commission of an act

which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall
conduct a preliminary hearing. (2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the
burden of going forward with its case and the burden of establishing: (a) probable cause
to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed it; and (b) by a
preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor
or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction.
2

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-602(l) provides: Any action filed by a county
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older
with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the
information charges any of the following offenses: (a) any felony violation of (i) Section
76-6-103, aggravated arson; (ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another; (iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated
kidnaping; (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated
robbery; (vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; (vii) Section 76-10-508,
discharge of afirearmfrom a vehicle; (viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated
murder; or (ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or (b) an offense other than those
listed in Subsection (1X&) involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or
convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have
been a felony if committed by an adult.
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101. See UTAH CODE ANN. S78-3a-601(l Va) and (b) (2000^; see also State in re A.B.. 936 P.2d
1091, 1094 (Utah App. 1997) (discussing direct file provision ofjuvenile offender statutes).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§62A-7-101 (18) defines a "secure facility" as "any facility operated by or

under contract with the division [of Youth Corrections], that provides 24-hour supervision and
confinement for youth offenders committed to the division for custody and rehabilitation."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§62A-7-101(18)(2000).

In the present case, Jordan is a juvenile over the age of sixteen. He was also charged
with a third degree felony. (Tr. at p. 51). However, he was not "previously committed to a
secure facility" as required by the direct filing statute. Jordan was an inmate of the San Juan
County Jail awaiting trial on another matter when the alleged assault occurred. (Tr. at p. 71).
The San Juan County Jail is an adult facility and is not a "secure facility" as that term is defined
by UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-7-101(l 8). It is not "operated under contract" with the Division of
Youth Corrections and does not provide confinement for youth offenders "committed to the
division for custody." Jordan was not committed to a "secure facility," nor was he previously
committed to such a facility. Because Jordan did not meet the statutory requirement of being
"previously committed to a secure facility," the district court did not have jurisdiction and
should not have tried the case.
While this issue has not been raised previously, new issues may be raised on appeal for
thefirsttime in cases of plain error. £ge State v. Perez. 946 P.2d 724,727-28 (Utah App. 1997).
To establish plain error, it must be shown that 1) an error exists; 2) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and 3) the error is harmful. See M- at 728 (quoting State v. Dunn 850
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)).
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In the a l t n n a f i u

r s n i il illii1 i (Hiril IIIIII'- inn iiLiiiii i i n n llllln issue nl n h n 1 ni.illn

jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See State v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927,930 (Utah 1992). In
Perank. the defendant was convicted of burglary in state court. Id Perank argued that the state
trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. of burglary INVHIIM IK t\as it Naln c Anna nan niid
the offense occurred within Native American Lands. M The court found that "even though
Pei ank pleaded g uiltj to the biii glai } charge and did not raise the issue of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction with respect to the burglary until the probation revocation proceeding, tht
properly before this court." Id The court concluded this part of its analysis by stating, 'the
issue :»f subject mat tei ji u isdiction can be i aised* it * im '//' w« ? " jy,(emphasis added) (citing
Glasmann v. Second District Court 12 P.2d 361,363 (1932)).
As discussed previously, an error existed. Jordan, a juvenile, was thrust into the adult
system: I I I K T H N in \ iiolatioii <tf sluliili

Whrlht/i i |ii

system is a 'critically important question and a juvenile must be afforded appropriate procedural
protections when that determination is made." State in Interest of ClatterbucL 700 P.2d 1076,
1079 (Utah 1985). Here, no determination. i\ as i nade. No certification hruriiin wa\ held imdci
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-3a-603 to determine if the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction.

I n d i a n v u s Minpl\ llin ,i iiViii iiiiiiiliiiii illliii JI lull i m i m inl.iiion ol s t a t u t e a s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e . T h i s
error should have been obvious to the trial court.
Finally, the error was harmful. Without this error, Jordan would have been tried as a
j u v e n i l e Mr w o u l d liavr btvtt n f f o i d n f (In; IUIIUTIIOM' ml I h e ( i n c i u l c s s s l r i n I J I I L I I are absent
in the adult system, and he would not have received a prison sentence.
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It is fundamental that a court without proper jurisdiction has no authority to enter a
binding judgment against a defendant. That is what has occurred in this case, and as a result,
Jordan's conviction should be reversed and he should be granted a new trial.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS JURORS FOR CAUSE
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee the right of an accused to a trial
by an impartial jury. Sge U.S. Constitution, Amend. VI; Utah Constitution, Art. I, sec. 12. As an
aspect of this protection, Utah courts have found that a trial court's error in failing to remove a
potential juror for cause is reversible error if the defendant demonstrates prejudice, VXL., shows
that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent. See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398
(Utah 1994).
In the present case, Jordan was compelled to accept partial jurors because he had to
exercise his peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been removed for cause.
Potential jurors Whitehat, Bradford, Lee, and Black were challenged for cause and not
dismissed. (Tr. at p.49). Each of these jurors had some kind of relationship with people involved
in law enforcement (Tr. at p. 17-21,49), for example, (a) Whitehafs uncle is a law enforcement
officer in Arizona (Tr. at p. 17-18); (b) Mr. Lee's brother apparently was some kind of law
enforcement officer, however, it is unclear what type of officer or how close the relationship was
because of numerous gaps in the record (Tr. at p.20); and (c) Ms. Black also had some kind of
relationship with a law enforcement officer, but once again, it is impossible to determine the
extent of this relationship because of the numerous gaps in the record. (Transcript, 19-20).
These relationships raised a question of bias as one of the State's key witnesses was a law
enforcement officer (Tr. at p.28). Witness Doug Pehrson was a corrections officer who claimed
to have seen the victim after the alleged crime. (Tr. at p.58). The extent and nature of each of
8

these potential witnesses' partiality is impossible to determine frorr
numerous omissions in the transcript. This issue is discussed in more detail under Argument "C"
^

challenges to remove these jurors

because the trial court did not remove them for cause. (Tr. at pp. 48-49). As a result of the loss
of these peremptory challenges, Jordan had to accept a partial jury. As the court in State v.
Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 507 (Utah 1997) stated, "\i (( fhr del< mtLiiil

m Ltd i >,li< «i l!i il ihi ' b v

>f

the peremptory challenge resulted in actual prejudice, reversal would be an available and
appropnule lemedi ' "
Jordan suffered prejudice here because members of t^
Jurors Begaye, Johnson, and Palmer ended up on the jury and stated that they read the San Juan
AVc <trJ ,HKI 1 he Hhu1 \htmtjm

I \in\>rama regularly. ( IY at pp 32, 45), ' 1 he court failed to

probe further to learn whether or not these jurors were prejudiced by reading these publicatioris
See State v. Woollev. 810 P.2d 440,444 (Utah App. i W 11 (requiring trial judge to address
potential bias through rehabi'i

^

so noting that

general statement by juror that they can be fair does not generally rebut inference of bias). In
Woolley. the court stated that the level of investigation necessary once voir dire has revealed
potential juror bias will vary from case to case and is dependant mil Hie iiiiiioi s i espouses In III
questions asked, gee State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440,445 (Utah App. 1991). The court
emphasized ilui Iln; t, splnmlmii should mil he nieieU pio lnriii;i Id An inference of bias
cannot be rebutted simply by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she can be
fair and impartial, however, this is what happened in the present case. Potential juror Lee
indicated that his brothn was imohni in \\\\\ entnrrrnii'nl i I

ii |i I'> m Lee apparently

indicated that he would be fair in weighing the testimony of other law enforcement officers,
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however, we cannot be sure of this as there are numerous gaps in the record. M. The same issue
and pro forma response occurred with potential juror Black. (Tr. at pp. 19-20). Jordan asked
that these jurors and other be removed for cause (Tr. at p.48). Because the trial court refused to
remove them (Tr. at p.48), Jordan had to accept a jury made up of jurors Begaye, Johnson, and
Palmer, who were biased. (Tr. at pp.32, 45).
In short, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss jurors for cause who should have been
dismissed. Jordan then had to use his peremptory challenges to remove these jurors and without
peremptory challenges left, Jordan was prejudiced by forced to accept partial jurors. This error
also requires reversal. &££ State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 507 (Utah 1997).
C.
MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW IS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO MISSING
PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT*
Numerous omissions in critical portions of the trial transcript require reversal and a new
trial in this case. In State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), the court found that inadequacies
in the transcript of the voir dire phase of trial required a new trial. Id at 447. The court noted
that in "43 pages of transcript, there are more than 35 notations of'inaudible' responses from
potential jurors..." Id- at 445. The court went on to state that "approximately 10 of the
inaudible responses either came from jurors about whose impartiality there is considerable
question based on other responses in the record, or they relate directly to the issue of whether the
trial judge erred in not eliciting sufficient information from jurors to permit intelligent and
informed jury selection." Id*
The court concluded its analysis by stating, "[w]hen faced with claims that a juror's
responses to voir dire questions demonstrated an actual bias, this Court is not at liberty on appeal
to assume what those answers showed when they are totally absent from the record and cannot
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be reconstructed by agreement of the parties. Therefore, it was error for the distrii I • i ii I 11 > (ail
der a new trial in the face of this inadequate record." Id. at 447

Numerous other

jurisdictions require reversal *»"l •» »r\\ ' T H » b""1" | L ' " / P H ! s mil idequate to allow
meaningful appellate review. See Shadle v. Municipality of Anchorage. 941 P.2d 904,905
, Blasco v. State. 680 So.2d 1052 (Fla.App.1996); State v. McFarland. 287
~ .64 rtowa 1980): Commonwealth v. Hams. V'<< N I • ~M HTM i n "

'r

I'm,,,

Of course, the mere existence of transcription errors does not always mandate a new trial.
&& State v. Menzies. 845 I "' 2d. 220, 228 (Utah 1992). A showing of prejudice is required to
overturn a conviction on the basis of transcription error, ill

\ ifli u IMMI in \ nn ilnr cnois

1

Menzies court found that "in order for mistakes in the transcript to prejudice Menzies' appeal,
the error must 1«* m ni ihr- \nn ilur ml ,i IUMI nlm nlhei sat on the case or was challenged for
cause and not dismissed." Id- at 229.
In Jordan's case, the portion of the Transcript dealing with jury selection consists of
approximately forty-eight (48) pn^1*-' H i -•' | *| • " ,IJI

|M l , l l 0 H

lorty-eight (48) pages, there are

approximately one hundred and thirty-three (133) notations of "inaudible" in the Transcrin
at ()(j J 4k* 1 1 in vast majority of these "inaudible" responses are from prospective jurors. (Tr. at
pp.2-49).
Specifically, potential jurors Whitehat, Bradford, Lee, and Black were challenged for
ca/t use ai id not < 11 s m 1 s s a I 1 11 11 (1 1. \ 1 1 he record does not show what questions were asked of
thesejurors or what responses, if any, they provided. The transcript sin.- w •, nnh uLkl ilu trial
court said regarding thesejurors: that their relationships with law enforcement officers "would
not affect their abilit ; (<" "'> inipjtilul 111 this ciisi"
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' (Tr jl p 18, lines 16-18) The record

does not show if these jurors were adequately questioned to make sure that they were
rehabilitated and competent to sit on the jury. Sge State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656,660 (Utah App.
1992) (stating that to rebut an inference of bias the trial court must adequately probe the jurors
potential bias); See also State v. Leleae. 993 P.2d 232,240 (Utah App. 1999) (stating that voir
dire procedures should not qualify jurors as quickly as possible on the basis of superficial
questions and a statement by the juror that they can be impartial, rather, trial courts must
liberally exercise their discretion in favor of questions designed to discover bias so counsel may
intelligently make for-cause and peremptory challenges). The transcript shows that there was a
concern about the impartiality of these potential jurors because of their relationships with law
enforcement officers. (Tr. at p.48). However, this Court cannot assess whether this concern was
adequately addressed because the record is incomplete. Therefore, the Menzies standard is met
in that the error or omission relates to jurors who were challenged for cause and not dismissed.
Menzies> at 229.
Menzies also provides that it is prejudicial to an appeal if the transcription error occurs in
the voir dire of a juror who sat on the case. M. In the present case, the voir dire ofjurors Maloy,
Chee, Begaye, and Johnson is almost completely inaudible in the transcript. (Tr. at pp. 11-14).
There is no way to determine the adequacy of the voir dire of these jurors.
In Menzies. the court ultimately concluded that the errors in the transcript were not
prejudicial, and that the record was adequate to provide a meaningful review on appeal. I$L at
232-233. The court distinguished Menzies' situation from Taylor in that in Taylor the
"omissions occurred in portions of the transcript that directly related to issues on appeal." Id- at
232. In the present case, most of the omissions occurred in the voir dire section of the
Transcript. Whether voir dire was proper and whether jurors were improperly kept on the panel
12

are Jordan's major issues on appeal.
Because the transcription omissions occur in the voir dire of both jurors who sat on the
case ,ii»(l noil ail i, ill! IIIIMI1. whtt vu in t lullc iip'ti lor r.i use and not dismissed, Jordan has been
prejudiced in his appeal. Therefore, he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
CONCLUSION
I \w trial i1 mi I Jul mil

II.IM

|ni(i .JH him

1 "iimlaii \ »isi' IhhiMiui is fundamental

and requires reversal Furthermore, Jordan was denied his right to an impartial jury because
numerous jurors were not properly dismissed for cause. Finally, transcription errors deny Jordan
his right to a meaningful appeal. Based on the lofcgoiii}* hudm iin/spalfulhi irquesh lhal (tins
Court reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial.
\ mi) ihiM I iSth day of October, 2000^
A.
Morgan
Grand County Public Defender
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2000,1 sent by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
Office of the Attorney Genera*, /\ii|vn.'it»» ! "*" "M< m
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Addendum I

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Ban Juan County

*"° MAR 1 6 2000

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128
Fax No. 435-587-3119

CLfiBK OF THE COURT

BY,

DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

FINDINGS, JUDGMENT
AND COMMITMENT

JORDAN VANCE CALLIHAM,
Defendant(8).

*

Criminal No. 9917-142

*

THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 16TH
day of MARCH, 2000, before the above entitled Court,

Craig C.

Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, Happy Morgan.
The Defendant was found
PRISONER,

guilty by a Jury to ASSAULT BY A

a Felony of the Third Degree Felony.

NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve
a term not to exceed

FIVE (5) YEARS, to be serve consecutively

with the sentence he is already serving.
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State
Prison.

-2IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant*

DATED: March 16, 2000

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the foregoing to HAPPY MORGAN, ATTORNEY
FORjDEFENDANT, APP, AND A COPY TO AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON, this
/&*** day of MARCH, 2000, by placing same postage prepaid in the
Monticello Post Office.

J

CLERK

